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AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
We address how Article III standing principles apply in 
proceedings to confirm arbitration awards under § 9 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  9 U.S.C. § 9.  Teamsters 
Local Union No. 177 (“Local 177” or the “Union”) sought 
confirmation of an arbitration award in its favor (the “Award”) 
per § 9, which provides that a district court “must grant” a 
confirmation order for an award upon application where the 
award has not been “vacated, modified, or corrected” under 
applicable provisions of the FAA.  § 9.  United Parcel Service, 
Inc. (“UPS”), the loser in arbitration, opposed confirmation 
and filed a cross-motion to dismiss, arguing that the District 
Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because there 
was no case or controversy as required by Article III of the 
Constitution, given that UPS agreed to abide by the Award and 
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corrected any subsequent violations of it.  The District Court 
denied the Union’s motion to confirm and granted UPS’s 
motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  It acknowledged a circuit split on whether a court 
may confirm an award absent an active dispute.   
We reverse and hold that the District Court had subject-
matter jurisdiction to confirm the Award even in the absence 
of a new dispute about it.  We agree with the Second Circuit 
that “the confirmation of an arbitration award is a summary 
proceeding that merely makes what is already a final 
arbitration award a judgment of the court.”  Florasynth, Inc. v. 
Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 1984).  Confirmation is 
the process through which a party to arbitration completes the 
award process under the FAA, as the award becomes a final 
and enforceable judgment.  See 9 U.S.C. § 13.  The FAA not 
only authorizes, but mandates, that district courts confirm 
arbitration awards by converting them into enforceable 
judgments through a summary proceeding.   
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
UPS and the Union are parties to a collective bargaining 
agreement (the “Agreement”).  It was in effect from August 1, 
2013 through July 31, 2018, and it governed the terms and 
conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees, 
including package car drivers who operate the ubiquitous 
brown UPS trucks and provide delivery and pick-up services.   
Local 177 represents more than 9,000 workers 
employed at various UPS facilities in northern and central New 
Jersey, and New York City and Orange County in New York.  
Article 46, Section 3 of the Agreement groups areas of 
principal responsibility.  Drivers are assigned to particular UPS 
buildings, called “home centers,” but may be assigned to other 
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buildings in other areas, subject to the restrictions of Section 2 
of Article 46.  That Article provides in relevant part:  
SECTION 2 
It is understood that employees may be assigned 
in classification to work in their home center or 
at places other than their home center, as follows: 
(a.) Employees will be required to accept 
assignments, within classification, when 
ordered, anywhere within their area. 
(b.) Any employee who refuses an assignment 
out of his/her classification under the above 
conditions will forfeit their rights to report pay. 
SECTION 3 
For the purposes of other assignments, the 
following areas are applicable: 
(1)    Lakewood, Tinton Falls, Trenton 
(2) Edison, Staten Island, Gould Avenue, 
Meadowlands 
(3)    Parsippany, Bound Brook, Mt. Olive 
(4)    Chester, New Windsor 
(5)    Saddle Brook, Spring Valley.  
J.A. 24.  Section 3 is known as the “sister building” provision.  
When drivers are assigned to work at a place outside their 
home center, as permitted in Section 2, then Section 3 governs 
where those drivers may be sent.  The locations grouped in 
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subsections (1) through (5) represent those groupings, known 
as “sisters.”  For example, a Lakewood domiciled driver may 
be assigned to work in the sister building in Tinton Falls or 
Trenton.  Forbidden, however, would be the assignment of a 
Lakewood driver to Staten Island.  These restrictions are the 
product of negotiations spanning several decades.   
Article 44 of the Agreement contains mandatory 
grievance and arbitration procedures.  It provides that if a 
matter is brought to arbitration, the arbitrator has the authority 
to decide the grievance, and that decision “shall be final and 
binding on the parties and employees involved.”  J.A. 17–18. 
The Union filed two grievances, one in July 2014 and 
the other in February 2015, respectively, alleging that UPS 
violated Article 46.  The July 2014 grievance alleged that New 
Windsor drivers were improperly assigned to Spring Valley.  
The February 2015 grievance alleged a Chester driver was also 
improperly assigned to Spring Valley.  
UPS denied the grievances, and the Union filed a 
demand for arbitration.  During the arbitration hearing, both 
parties were represented by counsel and had the opportunity to 
present testimony along with documentary evidence and to 
make arguments.  The Arbitrator sustained the grievances and 
ordered UPS to “cease and desist assigning package car drivers 
to work in buildings outside the areas designated in Article 46, 
Section 3 of the parties’ . . . Agreement.”  J.A. 47.  UPS 
“accept[ed] the Award,” and has never sought to challenge or 
vacate it.  J.A. 49. 
The Union alleges, and UPS does not deny, that the 
latter has subsequently violated the Award.  In April 2018 it 
did so by assigning a driver outside his contractually 
designated area.  Local 177 Secretary-Treasurer Chris 
Eltzholtz informed UPS District Labor Manager Steve Radigan 
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of the violation.  Eltzholtz later became aware of two more 
violations.  Radigan acknowledged them and assured Eltzholtz 
that the situation was corrected and would not occur again.  In 
June 2018, Eltzholtz learned that UPS had nonetheless violated 
the Award by assigning a driver to work outside a designated 
area.  He informed Radigan of the new violation.  Eltzholtz 
then traveled to a UPS facility in New Windsor, New York, 
and personally witnessed UPS about to violate the Award yet 
again by assigning a driver outside his assigned area.  Eltzholtz 
brought this to the attention of management, and it stopped the 
violation from occurring.  The Union ultimately obtained a 
monetary settlement for these violations.   
Thereafter, the Union moved for confirmation of the 
Award under § 9 of the FAA, which provides in relevant part 
that,  
[i]f the parties in their agreement have agreed 
that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon 
the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and 
shall specify the court, then at any time within 
one year after the award is made any party to the 
arbitration may apply to the court so specified for 
an order confirming the award, and thereupon 
the court must grant such an order unless the 
award is vacated, modified, or corrected as 
prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.  
9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added).  The Union argues that it 
petitioned for confirmation in light of UPS’s repeated 
violations and to preserve its rights in case of future violations.  
UPS opposed the Union’s motion and filed a cross-motion to 
dismiss, arguing that the District Court did not have 
jurisdiction because confirmation requires a pending case or 
controversy about the arbitration award, and no case or 
controversy existed, as there were no ongoing violations.  
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In its decision, Teamsters Local Union No. 177 v. 
United Parcel Servs., 409 F. Supp. 3d 285 (D.N.J. 2019), the 
District Court acknowledged a circuit divide on whether a 
court may confirm an award in a labor arbitration absent a then-
existing dispute about the arbitration award.  Id. at 290.  It 
noted that the First Circuit has held that confirmation is not 
proper without an active controversy, see Derwin v. Gen. 
Dynamics Corp., 719 F.2d 484, 492–93 (1st Cir. 1983), while 
the Second Circuit has held that a district court must confirm 
an arbitration award if the statutory requirements are met even 
absent a new dispute, see Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157 (2d 
Cir. 2007); see also Ottley v. Schwartzberg, 819 F.2d 373 (2d 
Cir. 1987); Florasynth, 750 F.2d 171.  When the District Court 
followed Derwin, the Union appealed to us. 
II. JURISDICTION 
The District Court had statutory subject-matter 
jurisdiction under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, along with the usual federal 
question jurisdiction accorded by 28 U.S.C. § 1331.1   
 
1 Section 9 of the FAA does not provide an independent 
basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, see Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25, n.32 (1983); 
Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 834 F.3d 242, 255 (3d 
Cir. 2016), but § 301 of the LMRA does, see Citgo Asphalt Ref. 
Co. v. Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l 
Union Local No. 2-991, 385 F.3d 809, 815 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Even where a complaint does not expressly plead LMRA 
claims, courts usually consider it to state a claim under § 301 
if it pertains to violations of contracts between an employer and 
a labor organization.  See Allis–Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 
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That there is federal statutory and federal question 
jurisdiction is clear.  The harder question—the one before us 
here—is whether there was a sufficient “case or controversy” 
under Article III so as to confer jurisdiction on the District 
Court.   
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review de novo the District Court’s order granting 
a motion to dismiss.  Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  
III.  DISCUSSION 
To repeat, UPS argues that the District Court lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award 
under FAA § 9 because, post-Award, there was no longer a 
“case or controversy,” which the Constitution’s Article III 
requires.   
A. Confirmation –– the Final Step and Remedy in 
Arbitration  
To establish that a “case or controversy” exists, a party 
seeking relief must have, among other things, standing.  In 
legal jargon this requires that a plaintiff show “(1) an ‘injury in 
fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a ‘likel[ihood]’ that the 
injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable decision.’”  Susan B. 
Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157–58 (2014) 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 
(1992)).  Think of standing as a stake in the outcome, and what 
a court does can help a party claiming to be hurt.  For example, 
a plaintiff whose injuries have been fully remedied before 
 
U.S. 202, 220 (1985); Berda v. CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 21 n.1 
(3d Cir. 1989).   
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seeking judicial relief cannot show a sufficient risk of 
imminent injury, and thus lacks standing.  Cf. Holmes v. 
Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 136–37 
(3d Cir. 2000) (holding that putative class representatives who 
settled their claims through administrative means prior to filing 
their complaint lacked standing).  And Congress cannot by 
statute grant courts jurisdiction where there is no case or 
controversy.  See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362–
63 (1911) (holding that Congress could not confer on federal 
courts the ability to hear a matter if it lacked a “case or 
controversy”). 
The parties do not dispute that the causation and 
redressability prongs of the standing analysis are satisfied; only 
at issue is whether Local 177 was injured.  UPS argues that, 
because it has agreed to abide by the arbitration award and has 
remedied any violations of it thus far, the case-or-controversy 
requirement is not satisfied, as the Union has not suffered and 
will not imminently suffer an injury.  
We disagree.  Under the FAA a party’s injuries are only 
fully remedied by the entry of a confirmation order.  The statute 
“creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and 
regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate . . . .”  
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 n.32.  Congress 
enacted the FAA to “reverse the longstanding judicial hostility 
to arbitration agreements . . . , and to place arbitration 
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”  EEOC 
v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  Once parties contract to 
settle their disputes by arbitration, federal courts become 
involved only in limited circumstances for limited purposes.   
The FAA “authorizes district court involvement in the 
arbitration process primarily in two ways.”  John Hancock 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 1998).  
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The first is “when a party resists arbitration under an existing 
arbitration clause.”  Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4).  Second, 
“when enforcement of an arbitration award is sought[,] . . . the 
statute authorizes the district court to confirm, vacate, or 
modify the award under a narrow scope of judicial review.”  Id. 
(citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11); see also Isidor Paiewonsky Assoc., 
Inc. v. Sharp Prop. Inc., 998 F.2d 145, 154 n. 11 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Specifically, the FAA provides in relevant part that a court, 
save exceptions not before us, “must grant” a timely request 
for an arbitration award.  § 9.2  Once confirmed, an arbitration 
award becomes a judgment of the court, entitled to “the same 
force and effect, in all respects, as, and . . . subject to all the 
provisions of law relating to, a judgment in [any other] action.”  
§ 13.   
Thus, barring any dispute whether the arbitration award 
shall be vacated, modified, or corrected, it is confirmation 
under § 9 that converts the award into a judgment of the court 
and completes the arbitration process under the FAA 
framework.  This puts an award on the “same footing” as other 
legally enforceable documents.  Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289.  
Put another way, the dispute the parties went to arbitration to 
resolve is “live” until the arbitration award is confirmed and 
the parties have an enforceable judgment in hand.  See, e.g., 
Ameriprise Bank, FSB v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 12-cv-1113, 
2012 WL 5906400, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2012) (holding 
that “a federal court constrained by Article III may confirm an 
award even in the absence of a new dispute involving the 
award’s application or enforcement” because the “controversy 
between the parties remains live until the arbitral award is 
confirmed”); National Football League Players Assoc. v. 
National Football League Mgmt. Council, No. 08-cv-3658, 
 
2 The parties do not dispute that the Agreement includes 
a provision for confirmation of the Award in court.  
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2009 WL 855946, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2009) (holding 
the district court had jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration 
award absent a new dispute about the award and stating that 
“[t]he real question is whether . . . the Court should impose a 
new requirement that, in addition to the dispute which clearly 
exists between the parties on [the underlying issue being 
arbitrated], one of the parties must raise a new dispute in order 
to have the arbitral award confirmed”). 
The FAA explicitly requires that arbitration awards be 
confirmed.  What could be stronger than language that, upon 
application, a district court “must grant [a confirmation] order” 
unless the arbitration award is “vacated, modified, or 
corrected.”  § 9.  The Supreme Court tells us that § 9 “carries 
no hint of flexibility.”  Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587 (2008).  “There is nothing malleable 
about ‘must grant,’ which unequivocally tells courts to grant 
confirmation in all cases, except when one of the ‘prescribed’ 
exceptions applies.”  Id. (quoting § 9).  The Court further noted 
that § 9 “suggests that, so long as the parties contemplated 
judicial enforcement, the court must undertake such 
enforcement under the statutory criteria.”  Id. at n.6. 
We agree with the Second Circuit that “the confirmation 
of an arbitration award is a summary proceeding that merely 
makes what is already a final arbitration award a judgment of 
the court.”  Florasynth, 750 F.2d at 176 (citation omitted).  
That Circuit has long held that district courts have jurisdiction 
to confirm arbitration awards even in the absence of a new 
dispute about them.  In Florasynth, it reasoned that an “[a]n 
examination of the underlying purposes of the arbitration 
mechanism” supported this conclusion, as confirmation arms 
the winning party of an arbitration “with a court order . . . [and] 
a variety of remedies available to enforce the judgment.”  750 
F.2d at 176; see also Zeiler, 500 F.3d at 169 (“Confirmation 
. . . is a summary proceeding . . . , which is not intended to 
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involve complex factual determinations, other than a 
determination of the limited statutory conditions for 
confirmation or grounds for refusal to confirm. . . . At the 
confirmation stage, the court is not required to consider the 
subsequent question of compliance.”); Ottley, 819 F.2d at 377 
(“[A]ctions to confirm arbitration awards . . . are 
straightforward proceedings in which no other claims are to be 
adjudicated. . . . [I]n a confirmation proceeding, the court 
properly may consider only the statutory bases for modifying 
or vacating an award and challenges to the award’s clarity.”). 
Confirming an arbitration award under § 9 is not to be 
confused with litigating a dispute over the validity or accuracy 
of that award under § 10 or § 11, or seeking later to enforce 
that arbitration award where there is noncompliance.  Section 
9 expressly provides for confirmation in the absence of such 
disputes.  Once a court confirms an arbitration award and 
makes it a judgment of the court, noncompliance with that 
order is separately analyzed.  See Am. Nursing Home v. Local 
144, No. 89-cv-1704, 1992 WL 47553, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
4, 1992) (“The issues of compliance and confirmation are 
distinct . . . . [C]onfirmation of an arbitration award . . . is not 
a novel inquest into the merits of the award or compliance with 
it . . . .” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).  
Without a confirmation order, the parties would essentially 
have to relitigate the case via a suit to enforce the arbitration 
award.  But where there is such an order, and one of parties 
violates it, the court applies the analysis as when one of its 
orders is defied—it can penalize the non-complying party 
through contempt proceedings or the issuance of injunctive 
relief.  Contempt proceedings and a trial over the underlying 
dispute are clearly very different than the summary proceeding 
provided for by § 9. 
Thus, like the Second Circuit, we view the confirmation 
of an arbitration award as the final step in arbitration 
13 
 
proceedings under the FAA where there is no dispute about the 
validity or accuracy of that award under § 10 or § 11.  As a 
result, a party seeking to confirm an arbitration award 
continues to have a live stake in the proceeding, and thus it has 
standing to seek confirmation.3 
 
3 We limit our holding to an award for equitable relief 
and express no opinion as to whether a party that receives an 
arbitration award for money damages has standing to confirm 
the award in federal court after those damages are paid in full.   
Additionally, we note that an alternative way of 
understanding why confirmation of an arbitration award 
satisfies the jurisdictional existing or imminent injury-in-fact 
prong is to view confirmation as a statutory right created by the 
FAA.  See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545–49 
(2016) (stating that the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 
created a statutory right to fair and accurate credit reporting, 
and remanding for further assessment of whether the injury 
was sufficiently particularized and concrete).  Parties to 
arbitration forgo litigation with the expectation that under the 
FAA they will be able to obtain a judgment at the end of the 
process under § 9.  A party to arbitration suffers an injury when 
he is denied the right to obtain confirmation, for it is the 
judgment that makes the party whole and concludes the 
arbitration process.  Our case exemplifies this point.  UPS has 
recently and repeatedly violated the Award.  And although it 
states that it will comply and refrain from violating the Award 
further, that promise does not have the force of a judgement.  
If UPS violates the Award again, the Union may be forced to 
relitigate the case.  We need not engage in this separate 
jurisdictional analysis, however, because the principle is well 
established that district courts can preside over summary 
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B. Summary Proceedings and the District 
Court’s Imprimatur  
In the interest of further explaining the path forward, we 
analogize the confirmation of arbitration awards to other 
summary proceedings in which a district court enters orders 
without the parties filing complaints and appearing before it to 
litigate a matter in full.  For example, courts enter investigatory 
subpoenas ex parte without the filing of a formal complaint and 
hold summary proceedings to enforce Securities and Exchange 
Commission orders.  See, e.g., S.E.C. v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 
650, 657 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that Section 21(e) of the 
Exchange Act of 1934 permits the use of summary proceedings 
in district courts to enforce Commission orders); S.E.C. v. 
Sprecher, 594 F.2d 317, 319–20 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that 
the Securities Act of 1933 authorizes district courts to order 
enforcement of investigatory subpoenas on application by the 
S.E.C. in a summary proceeding without the filing of 
complaints by the Commission (citations omitted)).   
The Supreme Court has held summary proceedings 
permissible where expressly authorized by statute.  See New 
Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 362 U.S. 404, 406–07 
(1960).  Confirmation of arbitration awards is also a summary 
proceeding.  And it is authorized by § 9 of the FAA.  In 
Scanlon, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he very purpose 
of summary . . . trials is to escape some or most of these trial 
procedures.”  Id. at 406.  They may be “conducted without 
formal pleadings, on short notice, without summons and 
complaints, generally on affidavits, and sometimes even ex 
parte.”  Id; see also Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. 
of Chicago v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 
294 U.S. 648, 682 (1935) (holding that district court could 
 
proceedings (such as entering consent decrees or confirming 
arbitration awards) where there is statutory authorization. 
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preside over summary proceedings “without the formality in 
respect of pleadings which is required in actions at law or suits 
in equity”). 
The summary proceeding perhaps most analogous to the 
confirmation of arbitration awards is the entry of consent 
decrees.  They are orders or judgments that reflect the 
settlement terms agreed by the parties and contain an 
injunction.  See United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 
U.S. 223, 236 n.10 (1975) (stating that consent decrees “have 
attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees” and a “dual 
character”); FTC v. Enforma Natural Prods., Inc., 362 F.3d 
1204, 1218 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] consent decree is ‘no more 
than a settlement that contains an injunction.’” (quoting In re 
Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & IRAP Litig., 957 F.2d 
1020, 1025 (2d Cir. 1992))).  District courts have the power to 
enter consent decrees without first determining that a statutory 
or constitutional violation has occurred.  See Swift & Co. v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 311, 327 (1928).  Cf. Rufo v. Inmates 
of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992).  They “must 
spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction . . . . and must further the objectives 
of the law upon which the complaint was based.”  Local No. 
93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of 
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (citations omitted); see 
also Sansom Committee by Cook v. Lynn, 735 F.2d 1535, 1538 
(3d Cir. 1984) (stating that a district court has authority to enter 
a consent decree “as long as [its] terms . . . come within the 
general scope of the case made by the pleadings . . . [and] if the 
pleadings state a claim over which a federal court has 
jurisdiction.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
Here the FAA provides for confirmation proceedings to 
be summary proceedings akin to the entry of consent decrees 
by requiring that the parties “apply” for confirmation rather 
than file a complaint.  9 U.S.C. § 9.  “An ‘application’ is merely 
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a ‘motion,’” or a request for the court to make a particular 
ruling or enter a particular order, and not a formal lawsuit or 
“action.”  McCarthy, 322 F.3d at 657 (citations omitted).  This 
distinction applies to the FAA with equal force, as the statute 
specifically provides for an “application” for confirmation.   
Moreover, courts do not resolve these applications for 
relief using procedures for ordinary civil actions because the 
FAA provides for applications to be made and heard as 
motions rather than the filing of a complaint.  9 U.S.C. § 6 
(“Any application to the court hereunder shall be made and 
heard in the manner provided by law for the making and 
hearing of motions, except as otherwise . . . expressly provided 
[in the FAA].” (emphasis added)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(6)(B) 
(providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply only 
to the extent procedures are not provided for under the FAA); 
Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 275–76 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (stating that Rule 81 provides that the Federal Rules 
apply only to the extent that matters of procedure are not 
provided for under the FAA); Booth v. Hume Pub., Inc., 902 
F.2d 925, 931 (11th Cir. 1990) (same).  As the FAA expressly 
provides for an “application” for confirmation, does not 
instruct parties to file a complaint, and does not instruct the 
district court to carry on a formal judicial proceeding, § 9 
indeed calls for a summary proceeding.4 
 
4 Whether a proceeding is “summary” in nature, of 
course, does not address how Article III’s standing limitations 
apply to that proceeding.  Its summary nature defines only the 
procedures employed for motion practice, discovery, and so 
forth; it does not address whether the proceeding requires a live 
case or controversy in order to proceed.  Nevertheless, for the 
reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that Local 177 
demonstrated a live controversy here. 
17 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the District Court had 
jurisdiction to confirm the Award under § 9 of the FAA even 
in the absence of a new dispute about its terms because the 
underlying dispute between the parties remains live until entry 
of that order.  Confirmation is the final step of the FAA’s 
arbitration process.  By a truncated summary proceeding, the 
FAA directs district courts to give their imprimatur to 
arbitration awards by converting them into enforceable 
judgments of the court.  
C.  The Illogical Consequences of Requiring a 
New Dispute Before Confirmation  
We also note the practical absurdity and harmful 
consequences of holding that district courts cannot confirm 
arbitration awards in the absence of a new dispute.  First, if we 
allow UPS to challenge confirmation of the arbitration award 
at this stage, we would be allowing it to upend and undermine 
the statutory scheme of the FAA.  That scheme expressly gives 
more time to the parties to move for confirmation than to 
dispute the award.  While the statute of limitations for 
confirmation of arbitration awards under the FAA is one year, 
9 U.S.C. § 9, the time for moving to vacate or modify the award 
is three months, see § 12.  If the party seeking confirmation 
makes its application after that three-month period elapses, 
then the opposing party cannot, as a matter of law, assert a § 
10 or § 11 ground for vacating, modifying or correcting an 
award, even as affirmative defenses to the application to 
confirm.  See Florasynth, 750 F.2d at 175.  UPS is effectively 
challenging the arbitration award well outside the three-month 
statute of limitations.   
Second, requiring a new dispute about the arbitration 
award would allow, or even incentivize, the party that lost at 
arbitration to defeat confirmation simply by claiming it agrees 
to abide by the Award.  In the worst-case scenario, the losing 
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party could wait until after the statute of limitations to confirm 
an award has run to start violating it, and the winning party 
would be left to relitigate the case.  That UPS says it will stop 
moving employees outside of their home centers does not mean 
there was no injury to the Union’s members who were moved 
when the Award was violated previously, and it does not mean 
that the Union does not have a right to seek compliance with 
the Award in the future.  UPS cannot “defeat or frustrate 
confirmation simply by claiming acquiescence with the 
[A]ward[,]” and Local 177 is “entitled to obtain judicial 
confirmation in order to protect its rights under the award . . . 
.”  National Football League Players Assoc., 2009 WL 
855946, at *3.  
D. Parting With First Circuit Precedent  
In light of these considerations, we are not persuaded by 
the approach taken by the First Circuit in Derwin, 719 F.2d 
484, and adopted by the District Court.  In Derwin, 
representatives of a union sought confirmation of an arbitration 
award issued under a collective bargaining agreement between 
the union and a corporate employer.  The former did not allege 
any instances where the employer refused to abide by the 
award.  Rather, it relied on the language of the applicable state 
statute, which, like the FAA, provided for a right to 
confirmation when no party had challenged the award within 
30 days after issuance of it.  Id. at 486.  Derwin held that 
confirmation was “unwarranted,” and noted that 
[t]he union’s application for confirmation—
unlike the usual complaint seeking confirmation 
of an arbitrator’s award—does not seek 
resolution of a concrete dispute between the 
parties.  The union does not allege that the 
company has repudiated or violated the award in 
some particular calling for judicial resolution.  
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No relief involving specific enforcement of the 
. . . award is requested.  
Id.  The Court declined to “put its imprimatur upon an arbitral 
award in a vacuum” and dismissed the action to confirm it.  Id. 
at 491–93.  It reasoned that judicial economy counseled against 
the entry of a confirmatory award, and that a more economical 
approach was to require that confirmation petitions allege an 
actual violation or other dispute entitling the party to some 
relief.  Id. at 492.   
However, the First Circuit did not consider the 
mandatory language of the FAA, it did not consider whether 
an arbitration dispute was ongoing until confirmation of the 
arbitration award, and, puzzlingly, it considered instead how 
the limitations period in the state statute affected its 
jurisdiction.  It reasoned that because in the case before it the 
time to sue was either six or twenty years, the union would 
have plenty of time to seek to enforce the award if a dispute 
arose.  Recognizing the need for confirmation under certain 
circumstances, the Court nonetheless allowed that there would 
be a “most compelling basis” for confirmation even without a 
pending dispute in some instances: 
If there were a strict limitations period for actions 
to confirm, one could reasonably argue that, even 
in the absence of any current dispute over an 
award’s effort, a party should be entitled to 
obtain judicial confirmation in order to protect its 
rights under the award from lapse due to the 
passage of time.   
Id.  The Court did not explain why the statute of limitations 
would affect whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.  
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The District Court here followed the First Circuit and 
specifically relied on the latter’s statute-of-limitations 
reasoning.  In its analysis the District Court held that “two 
potentially dispositive factors” emerged from the case law: 
“(1) whether there is an ongoing dispute over the terms or 
enforcement of the award; and (2) whether there is a realistic 
probability that the employer can wait out the limitations 
period and violate the arbitration award when it is too late for 
the union to obtain judicial relief.”  United Parcel Servs., 409 
F. Supp. 3d at 293.  It acknowledged that if a one-year statute 
of limitations applied, like in the FAA, there would “surely be 
a realistic possibility that UPS could violate the order after it 
was too late for the Union to seek judicial confirmation.”  Id. 
at 294.  Yet the Court, relying on Derwin, applied the longer 
six-year statute of limitation under New Jersey law, and 
determined that such a period would give the Union “plenty of 
time to bring an action to confirm the award should a problem 
arise.”  Id.  
Neither the First Circuit nor the District Court here 
explained, however, how the ability of the winning party in an 
arbitration to file suit later has any bearing on the existence of 
a “case or controversy.”  Both ignored that statutes of 
limitations and a court’s power to hear a case are separate 
questions.  Accordingly, we decline to follow the First 
Circuit’s holding that a new dispute is required before an 
arbitration award can be confirmed, and we reverse the 
judgment of the District Court.   
We remand with instruction for the Court to confirm the 
Award unless the statutory grounds for rejecting it are satisfied.  
 
